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INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION
AND A MULTILATERAL TREATY
Victor Thuronyi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public international law of taxation is dominated by
over 1,5001 bilateral treaties (the number goes up steadily) for
the prevention of double taxation of income and capital. Virtu-
ally all of these are based on a single model treaty (the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Model2), and therefore exhibit a high degree of unifor-
mity. This treaty network has been called a "triumph of inter-
national law" and a framework for an international tax regime
based on the principles underlying these treaties.3 It has be-
come apparent, however, that the bilateral nature of this trea-
ty network involves inherent flaws which have become more
serious as the network has grown. The treaty network has
become cumbersome and inflexible and, in many instances, has
spawned opportunities for tax avoidance. This bilateral ap-
proach seems anomalous in an era where taxpayers have be-
come global and many other regulatory areas increasingly are
being dealt with globally by governments.4
This paper discusses why it would be desirable to replace
the existing bilateral network with a multilateral treaty (ad-
ministered by an appropriate international organization) and
* Senior Counsel (Taxation), International Monetary Fund. The views ex-
pressed are the author's personal views alone. The author is grateful for comments
received from participants in the Symposium on International Tax Policy in the
New Millennium, held at Brooklyn Law School, Nov. 9-10, 2000.
1. See Michael Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INVL L. 1357 (2001).
The figure of 1,500 is given in OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 14
(1998). Over the past decade, around 75 treaties have been added each year.
2. OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON IN-
COME AND ON CAPITAL (2000) (condensed version). There are other models, for
example the U.S. and U.N. models, but these also are based on the OECD Model.
3. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (2000);
David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the "International Tax System",
53 TAX L. REV. 137, 164 (1999).
4. See John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1,
1 (1999); DAVID W. WILLMIS, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 87-93 (1991).
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how this could be done.5 In contrast with most previous dis-
cussions, which have tended to conclude that a multilateral
treaty would be desirable but impracticable,6 I focus here on
how it might be possible to achieve this goal and why it is in-
creasingly important to do so.7
As an ideal type,8 a multilateral treaty would replace the
5. A similar diagnosis was formulated by Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax
Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?, 45 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 151,
157-60 (1991) (arguing that the OECD Model is "reaching an impasse in the trans-
fer pricing area," and that apportionment on a multilateral basis is required to
deal with multinational corporate groups). Vann also argues that the Model is
irrelevant or inappropriate in dealing with issues such as thin capitalization, for-
eign currency conversion, and finance leasing. He suggests that an international
organization structured along the lines of the GATT (now WTO) would lend need-
ed flexibility to deal with these and other international issues. Along similar lines,
Michael Rigby, A Critique of Double Tax Treaties as a Jurisdictional Coordination
Mechanism, 8 AUSTRALIAN L. F. 301 (1991), argues that existing treaties have not
been successful in the areas of controlled foreign corporations, thin capitalization,
and transfer pricing, and that the existing treaty network is insufficiently flexible.
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 166, finds that "the logic of present trends is towards
a web of many thousands of agreements, being updated at an increased rate, and
being subject both to treaty overrides by national legislation and disparate judicial
and administrative interpretations and applications." He considers a "piecemeal
multilateral approach," whereby "some part of the content of double taxation
agreements could be standardised" to be a partial solution to these problems. See
id. at 167. VITO TANzI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD (1995), argues that
globalization is putting tax systems under substantial pressure and that the coor-
dinating role of the OECD "falls far short of what it needs to be on a worldwide
scale . . . . There is no world institution with the responsibility to establish desir-
able rules for taxation and with enough clout to induce countries to follow those
rules. Perhaps the time has come to establish one."
6. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 2, 1 40 at 17 ("there are no reasons to be-
lieve that the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention involving all Member
countries could now be considered practicable"); Vann, supra note 5; Outgoing
Treasury Staffer Discusses Treaty Policy, 76 TAX NOTES 1536 (1997) ("It has not
proven practical to have a multilateral tax treaty."); ARNOLD A. KNECHTLE, BASIC
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW 188-90 (1979). Joel Slemrod, Ta Cacoph-
ony and the Benefits of Free Trade, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 283,
304-06 (J. Bhagwati & R. Hudec eds., 1996) makes the related point that multilat-
eral coordination of tax systems will be difficult to achieve as a political matter.
7. I assume that a certain degree of fiscal coordination is desirable. See Peg-
gy Musgrave & Richard Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and Competition in an
International Setting, in INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS 61 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. et al. eds., 1990). Alec Easson's
words come to mind in this context: "If the existing system is so defective as to
require radical change, yet every proposal for such a change is dismissed as utopi-
an, it ought to be possible to devise less radical proposals that could conceivably
be adopted and that would result at least in substantial improvements." Alec
Easson, A New International Tax Order - Responding to the Challenge, 45 BULL.
INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 465 (1991).
8. It would be possible to go even further and envision an internationally
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existing treaty network with a single uniform text. Those expe-
rienced in treaty negotiation rightly have pointed out that it
would be impossible to achieve such uniformity without sub-
stantial political will and harmonization of tax systems. Nei-
ther is forthcoming in the near future. But it is possible to
approach this ideal in a gradual manner,9 as discussed in Sec-
tion IV below. Exactly how this is to be done would be the
subject of negotiation, but in broad outlines what I envision is
an agreement with several parts. First, there would be a uni-
form text covering the same material as the existing OECD
Model, and probably closely based on that model in terms of
drafting. This text would serve as a "template" for those bilat-
eral treaty relationships that would continue to exist alongside
the multilateral treaty. All countries joining the agreement
would sign on to this template. Second, there would be one or
more multilateral treaties, consisting of the bilateral template,
with necessary adjustments in light of the multilateral nature
of the treaty. In contrast to the bilateral template, only a limit-
ed set of countries would, in all likelihood, be willing to sub-
scribe to a multilateral treaty. As explained below, the most
likely candidates would be the European Union (EU) member
countries. Third, there would be additional agreements going
beyond the scope of the current OECD Model. Fourth, an insti-
tutional framework would be established to manage the treaty,
including the granting of jurisdiction to an international orga-
nization with membership open to all countries. Finally, tran-
sition arrangements and derogations would deal with the pro-
cess of folding the existing treaty network into the new treaty.
Existing treaties could be kept in force until negotiators had
the opportunity to review each treaty and bring it into line
with the new framework to the extent desired, with any re-
harmonized system. However, this seems too utopian to merit discussion as a
politically feasible alternative. See Richard Bird, Shaping a New International Tax
Order, 42 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 292, 297 (1988).
9. The idea of a "partial" multilateral approach has been raised by Helmut
Loukota, Multilateral Tax Treaty Versus Bilateral Treaty Network, in MULTILATER-
AL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 85, 98-99, 103
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 167; Bird,
supra note 8, at 298 (recognizing that a reformulation of the international tax
system "can only be worked out by the interested parties over a long period of
time through continued, and no doubt painful, negotiations in some appropriate
international forum").
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maining differences dealt with by derogation. Future treaties
would be negotiated within the new framework.
While not as tidy as replacing all existing treaties in one
fell swoop, the proposed approach has the advantage of being
more realistic and of bringing many of the benefits of
multilateralism, even though complete uniformity is not
achieved. The agreement would simplify substantially the
steadily increasing verbiage of the bilateral treaty network.
Most importantly, the proposed arrangement would put in
place a process under which countries could work on resolving
the substantive problems with the international tax system
that many commentators have identified.
The advantages of a multilateral treaty over a bilateral
network long have been recognized.' ° In contrast to the exist-
ing network of bilateral treaties, which has become ossified, a
multilateral treaty would provide a vehicle for continual re-
newal as problems arise with the functioning of the interna-
tional tax system, allowing amendment or interpretation of its
terms to affect all countries at the same time. A multilateral
treaty also would provide a framework for continuous review of
the relevance of those weaknesses that remain. It would allow
consideration of solutions (such as the apportionment of in-
come of multinationals among the countries in which they
operate) that cannot be applied on a bilateral basis alone. A
multilateral treaty would be able to handle triangular cases
and treaty shopping much better than a bilateral network.
Such a treaty also could cover taxes other than the income tax,
such as social security, value added taxes (VAT), estate and
gift taxes, and excises, as well as tax procedural questions.
While in principle it would be possible to extend the existing
bilateral treaty network to cover such taxes, in practice the
negotiations would be so lengthy that such an extension would
10. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (1980) ("The
creation of a network of bilateral tax treaties based on a common model will be
an important step on the way leading to the eventual conclusion of a world-wide
multilateral tax convention for the avoidance of double taxation."); Loukota, supra
note 9, at 86-88; Michael Lang, The Concept of a Multilateral Tax Treaty, in MUL-
TILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 189
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998). GARY HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATION-
AL INCOME 169 (1992) suggests negotiation of a single tax treaty with the entire
European Community.
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never happen.
Let me be quite clear that I am not supposing that all the
existing tax treaties can be replaced with a single uniform text.
Rather, what I envisage is a situation where countries enter
into a commitment to negotiate all future treaties based on
such a text (and over a transitional period to bring existing
treaties into a format that is based on this text). Such a com-
mitment would not preclude countries from agreeing on word-
ing that deviates from the uniform template. But if countries
want to deviate, the deviation would have to take the form of
amendments to the template. To some extent, this would be a
question of form only. But it would have an effect on substance
because the requirement to set forth the agreement in the form
of a uniform text plus amendments would tend to limit the
extent of amendment, and because countries would agree to
negotiate with a view to limiting the extent of deviations. This
is actually not a big difference from the current situation,
because, in practical terms, countries already negotiate their
treaties so as to largely hew to the text of the OECD Model. It
has been noted that the OECD Model "has almost acquired the
status of a multilateral instrument."" The proposal described
in this paper would place the existing arrangement on a
sounder legal footing. In legal terms, interpretations of the text
by the international agency in charge and any agreed upon
amendments would affect all the treaties that are based on the
common text. That is because the bilateral treaties would take
an ambulatory form: they would be based on the text as inter-
preted and as amended from time to time. 2
While the initial focus of the proposed multilateral treaty
would be to rationalize the current tax treaty network, the
treaty also would present an opportunity for establishing a
11. AMEICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES
INCOME TAX TREATIES 3 (1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE].
12. This may require a certain number of clerical and conforming amendments
to individual agreements when changes are made to the uniform general text. Be-
cause parliaments will have to ratify the general amendments anyway, these cleri-
cal and conforming amendments can be included in the documents to be ratified
by parliaments. See Jones, supra note 4, at 6 (recognizing that the existing treaty
network is very close to a multilateral treaty). However, in concluding that "there
seems to be no obvious advantage in having multilateral tax treaties," Jones fails
to consider the advantages discussed in this article. Id.
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new international tax order. What precisely this should mean
and how far international cooperation should go need not be
decided ab initio-the process can be allowed to evolve, as with
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). I refrain
from trying to describe here the precise elements that should
be included in the initial text of the treaty, since the answer to
what the treaty should contain depends on the specific dynam-
ics of the process for negotiating the treaty.
II. PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM
The main focus of this paper is on the bilateral treaty
network, so I will not dwell on other problems of the interna-
tional system. These problems are in any event examined else-
where in this Symposium and in the literature. 3 In addition,
I do not advance particular substantive proposals for reform,
but rather focus on process. It suffices for purposes of this
paper, therefore, to note that there are indeed significant prob-
lems with the operation of the current international tax system
and that the proposed process would provide a better frame-
work for addressing them than the one we have today.
The international tax system, as currently constituted, is
dominated by the principle of national autonomy, with only a
limited degree of international coordination. It has become
apparent that the existing system favors private actors-both
multinational companies and wealthy individuals-who can
take advantage of the lack of coordination to minimize the
taxes they pay, and that the growing importance of interna-
tional transactions increases the potential for such tax
minimization.'4 Under longstanding principles of public inter-
national law, each country possesses an autonomous jurisdic-
tion to tax persons and transactions that have a nexus with
that country. When countries exercise that jurisdiction on their
own, transactions that have a connection with more than one
13. See, e.g., Alec Easson, Taxing International Income, in TAX CONVERSATIONS
419 (Richard Krever ed., 1997); Sven-Olof Lodin, What Ought to Be Taxed and
What Can Be Taxed: A New International Dilemma, 54 BULL. INTL FISCAL DOCU-
MENTATION 210 (2000).
14. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Cornpetition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575-1603 (2000);
SOL PICCIOTrO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION (1992); ANTHONY GINSBERG,
INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 1-33 (1994).
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country may suffer double taxation or, as a result of luck or
tax planning, perhaps taking advantage of favorable tax re-
gimes offered by countries engaging in tax competition, may
escape the taxing grasp of any country. A network of tax trea-
ties provides some coordination, in most cases eliminating
double taxation between treaty countries.
Multinational corporations take advantage of the current
situation by planning their affairs to exploit inconsistencies in
the network of national tax laws and treaties. By dint of such
tax planning, they are often able to pay substantially less tax
than that paid by taxpayers whose operations are confined to a
single country. As the contributions by Mintz and Tanzi to this
symposium attest,15 the situation has been getting worse and
is likely to continue to worsen. Many businesses and individu-
als use a combination of tax treaties and tax havens to avoid
or evade tax. 6 National authorities often are helpless against
these tactics because they lack the information to find out
what taxpayers are doing, because of practical difficulties in
auditing taxpayers, or because the tax planning is allowed
under current law.
Moreover, countries frequently engage in tax competition
to attract investment from elsewhere, thereby undermining the
tax bases of other countries. The attitude of OECD countries
towards tax competition appears to be shifting. Tax sparing
provisions in tax treaties-which tend to encourage developing
countries to provide tax holidays and other investment incen-
tives-have fallen into disfavor,"7 and multilateral agencies
typically discourage developing and transition countries from
offering such incentives on the basis that business usually is
attracted by other factors and that precious revenue is being
given away." Nevertheless, the existing international tax sys-
15. See Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26
BROOK. J. INT' L. 1285 (2001); Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Develop-
ments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1261 (2001).
16. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Aspects of Offshore Financial Centers, 2 CURRENT
DEv. IN MONETARY AND FIN. LAw (forthcoming 2001) for a discussion of the differ-
ence between avoidance and evasion.
17. See OECD, supra note 2. The OECD Council has pointed out that "the
granting of tax sparing in tax conventions may offer wide opportunities for tax
planning and tax avoidance" and "may have the effect of provoking harmful tax
competition between countries." Id. at 83. The Council has recommended that,
where countries continue to grant tax sparing, they do so on a limited basis and
subject to safeguards. See id. at 42-43.
18. See OECD, supra note 1, at 12; Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1643; David
1647
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
tem does not give sufficient support to countries to move away
from the investment incentive approach, and the current situa-
tion is characterized by substantial tax competition.19
This is not to say that the current situation is totally anar-
chic. Most of the industrialized countries have in place anti-
avoidance rules that limit the damage (e.g., controlled foreign
corporation provisions). A network of bilateral treaties covers
most of the industrialized countries and eliminates virtually all
cases of double taxation. Further, there is a good deal of infor-
mal coordination: Countries find out what others are doing and
adopt common solutions. Moreover, the major industrialized
countries have undertaken to limit harmful tax practices, al-
though this effort is as yet at an incipient stage."
IlI. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING TREATY NETWORK
The main avenue for coordination of the international tax
system is a network of bilateral tax treaties for the prevention
of double taxation of income and capital. This is not an ideal
structure. Informed observers have known for a long time that
it would be much better instead to have a multilateral treaty.
However, those in charge of preparing model treaties have
several times dismissed as impractical the notion that a multi-
lateral treaty could replace the bilateral treaty network. The
next section addresses this issue, acknowledging the problems
with a multilateral treaty, but showing that they can be over-
come. This section first examines the problems inherent in the
bilateral treaty network.
Holland & Richard J. Vann, Income Tax Incentives for Investment, 2 TAX LAW
DESIGN AND DRAFTING 986 (V. Thuronyi ed., 1998); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax
Holidays and Investment Incentives - A Comparative Analysis, 53 BULL. INT'L FIS-
CAL DOCUMENTATION 326 (1999); TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1991); James T. Areddy, Asian
Investment Outlook: A Taxing Issue: Handouts and Holidays - Governments Trade
Tax Breaks for New Investment all the Time, But There Isn't Much Evidence it
Works, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 11, 2000, at S6.
19. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1579-1603.
20. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMiITTEE ON
FISCAL AFFAIRS (2000).
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A. Existing Treaty Framework Limits Unilateral Action
Individual countries often wish to take steps on their own
to deal with international tax avoidance. The current treaty
network may fail to facilitate, or may even inhibit, such action.
This may occur for a couple of reasons.
First, the absence of a multilateral framework means that
countries have to take steps on their own. It is often difficult
for countries to take unilateral action to curb abuses and ex-
pand their taxation of international transactions.2' A few ex-
amples can illustrate this point. A single country may be reluc-
tant to tax interest paid to non-residents because to do so
would drive investors away. A single country may be reluctant
to tax on a current basis businesses located abroad because
that would place its companies at a disadvantage and could
cause corporations to flee the jurisdiction, incorporating them-
selves in countries with more favorable regimes.
In order to feel safe to move ahead, individual countries
would need assurance that others also are doing so. To some
extent, this assurance can be provided without a formal inter-
national agreement. But the existence of a permanent forum
with universal membership, created by a multilateral treaty, in
the context of which agreements on various issues could be
reached, would represent a considerable improvement over the
current situation where, at best, agreement to cooperate has to
be cobbled together on an ad hoc basis.22
Second, existing tax treaties are often inconsistent (or
arguably inconsistent) with various anti-abuse measures that
countries take or contemplate taking. Thus, not only does the
current system not facilitate reforms, it actually may hinder
them in some cases. Examples are controlled foreign corpo-
ration legislation, rules to tax gains of non-residents on dispo-
sitions of interests in real property, and anti-thin-capitalization
rules. Each of these provisions arguably is inconsistent with
provisions of treaties (in the event of such inconsistency, the
21. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1665-68, 1675; WILLIAMs, supra note 4,
216, at 35.
22. The OECD-led effort against harmful tax competition being an example of
a relatively informal way in which countries are cooperating under the current
regime. Although the OECD Council has taken various decisions pursuant to this
effort, they are not legally binding even on OECD members, let alone on non-
members.
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consequence would be either that treaty obligations are violat-
ed, if the domestic law takes the form of a treaty override, or
that the treaty can be used to invalidate the domestic law
provisions)."
A multilateral treaty could facilitate, rather than hinder,
reforms which individual countries wish to pursue. To the
extent that contemplated reforms are inconsistent with the
existing multilateral treaty, countries could discuss and agree
on amendments that would permit reform, or even provide for
internationally coordinated action. For example, a multilateral
arrangement is needed to deal with the taxation of interest
income earned by non-resident investors. Whatever arrange-
ment is agreed to-information exchange, a withholding tax, or
some combination-all, or nearly all, countries with significant
capital markets (end users of capital) must participate, because
individual countries cannot go it alone. Formally, a treaty may
not be required for concerted action, but if countries can agree
on such action, then presumably there would be the basis for
entering into a treaty, thereby solidifying the steps to be tak-
en.24 The multilateral treaty context could institutionalize the
process, by providing a forum and procedure for additional
agreements, which would be brought from time to time to leg-
islatures for ratification.
23. See Rigby, supra note 5; Daniel Sandler, Case Notes, Tax Treaties and
Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, 1998 BRIT. TAX REV. 52; Geerten
Michielse, Treaty Aspects of Thin Capitalization, 51 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMEN-
TATION 565 (1997); Nicholas Not, Swiss and French Tax Authorities Disagree on
Compatibility of French CFC Rules With Treaty, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 2387 (2000).
24. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1669 (arguing that a uniform withhold-
ing tax could be imposed by OECD countries without entering into a tax treaty to
do so). Whether a treaty formally is entered into or not seems to be beside the
point, however, given that in the absence of a treaty, an understanding would
have to be reached among all the countries concerned and uniform legislation
conforming to that understanding enacted. This process would not be very different
from treaty ratification. A regime for cooperation against tax evasion by nonresi-
dent portfolio investors was proposed in HUFBAUER, supra note 10, at 68-70. The
EU has reached an agreement in principle whereby a directive on taxation of
cross-border saving would be adopted by the end of 2002 under which there would
be exchange of information, but for a transitional period of 7 years countries could
levy a withholding tax. See Henri de Bresson et al., Les quinze trouvent un
compromis dilatoird sur la fiscalite de l'pargne, LE MONDE (June 22, 2000).
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B. Bilateral Network is Inconsistent with Multinational
Business Structure
The current network of bilateral treaties probably would
work well if each multinational corporate group were located
in no more than two countries. Each bilateral treaty could then
appropriately provide for the taxation of the group. There is, of
course, no such constraint on multinational enterprises, which
typically establish subsidiaries or branches in a number of
countries, including tax havens, in such a way as to take ad-
vantage of the existing treaty network. The aim of such tax
planning is to go beyond eliminating double taxation and to
reduce tax to a minimum. A simple example from the early
1990s can illustrate this point.' Suppose that a multinational
corporate group headquartered in the Netherlands created a
finance company by establishing a branch in Switzerland. A
U.S. subsidiary of the Netherlands' company paid interest and
royalties to the Swiss branch. Under the U.S.-Netherlands
tax treaty, there was a reduced or zero withholding tax on the
payments to the Swiss branch. Under Swiss tax law, the
branch paid little or no tax, and under Netherlands' tax law
the Swiss branch was not subject to tax because it was located
abroad. As a result, instead of just eliminating double taxation,
the treaty resulted in zero or minimal taxation because the
taxpayer adopted a corporate structure to take advantage of
the treaty using more than two countries. A protocol was in-
serted into the U.S.-Netherlands treaty to deal with this case,
but the protocol covers only limited situations, and there are
still opportunities to use complex corporate structures that are
not limited by such anti-abuse rules.
Other structures take advantage of inconsistent treatment
of the same legal arrangement under the tax laws of different
countries. Taxpayers can exploit such inconsistencies to
achieve a favorable after-tax result.26 For example, a taxpayer
in one country may issue a hybrid financial instrument to a
taxpayer in another country, structured in such a way that
25. The example is taken from Yves Bonnard, The Triangular Case in the
New U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty: Mechanisms and Tax Planning, 23 DENV. J.
INTL L. & POLY 161 (1994). I am told that changes in the law make this specific
transaction no longer feasible.
26. See generally TAX MANAGEMENT INTL F. (June 2000); Avi-Yonah, supra
note 3; Rosenbloom, supra note 3.
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payments are treated as deductible interest in the hands of the
payor but as exempt dividends in the hands of the payee. An-
other case is that of a cross-border finance lease. The lessor's
country may grant depreciation allowances to the lessor, while
the lessee's country treats the lessee as the owner of the prop-
erty and allows the lessee to depreciate it. Other structures
take advantage of the inconsistent characterization of an enti-
ty: One country may consider a given entity to be an indepen-
dent taxpayer, while another country involved in the transac-
tion may disregard the entity for tax purposes.
Cross-border arbitrage of this sort violates what Avi-Yonah
has called the single-tax principle: Income from cross-border
transactions should be subject to tax once and only once (it
should not be subject to double taxation, but also should not
escape taxation)." While some steps can be taken to imple-
ment the single-tax principle on a unilateral28 or bilateral ba-
sis, 9 a better solution, at least for some of the problems aris-
ing from a mismatch between different systems, is a multilat-
eral one under which countries would agree to provide con-
sistent treatment in certain areas ° or to make adjustments
for specified cross-border transactions that would otherwise be
treated inconsistently. For example, it is not inconceivable that
a harmonized set of rules distinguishing finance leases from
operating leases could be agreed upon, under which finance
leases would be assimilated to loan transactions. Likewise, the
problems stemming from a "check the box" regime could be
minimized by a multilateral agreement under which a given
27. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3.
28. See id. See also David I. Kempler, United States, 22 TAX MGMT. INT'L J.
41 (2000); Francis G. Sandison, United Kingdom, 22 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 38 (2000);
Christian Emmeluth, Denmark, 22 TAX MGMT. INTL J. 13 (2000).
29. Recent German treaties include a provision that deals with certain in-
stances of inconsistent characterization. In particular, where such inconsistent
characterization leads to exemption in Germany, this provision denies the exemp-
tion, applying a foreign tax credit instead. See Agreement Between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Republic of Lithuania for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, protocol, para. 7 (signed
July 22, 1997). This provision would, for example, take care of the hybrid financial
instrument noted in the text, but would probably not take care of the other cases.
30. For an example of an agreement on harmonized tax treatment, see REC-
OMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF
BRIBES TO FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1996). While not legally binding, it repre-
sents a political commitment by the OECD member countries to harmonize their
tax rules by denying a deduction for bribes.
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type of entity would be treated consistently by all countries
party to the agreement. An effective solution to problems of
cross-border arbitrage would require a continuing review of the
technical interaction between (and among) tax systems. The
best candidate for such a task would be an international orga-
nization charged with cooperation in taxation (as discussed
below).
C. Bilateral Network Represents a Fragmented Approach
By its very nature, the bilateral treaty network is suited to
working out problems between individual countries, but not so
well suited to providing an architecture that works for the
world tax system as a whole. Each treaty is negotiated under a
do ut des approach.31 This makes each treaty sui generis, with
provisions set so as to balance the competing interests of the
two countries involved. The implications for the worldwide
system are often a subordinate consideration. Most-favored-
nation clauses may, however, inject a multilateral dimension,
as will the bargaining precedent which any concession can
establish, so the story is not purely one of two countries negoti-
ating in isolation.
As a result of this approach, the bilateral treaty network
has, to some degree, become imbalanced. Treaty negotiators
often consider treaties to be a way of providing benefits for the
businesses headquartered in their country,32 instead of think-
ing about how the treaty fits in with the global tax system. By
contrast, while a multilateral treaty allowing for bilateral
derogations will not solve all problems arising from individual
reciprocity immediately, it inevitably will get negotiators
thinking about the global picture and will provide them with a
tool to reach multilateral understandings that prevent treaties
from being abused and that provide for an appropriate division
of taxing jurisdiction over corporate groups that extend over
more than two countries.
31. See Franz Wassermeyer, Does the EC Treaty Force the Member States to
Conclude a Multilateral Tax Treaty?, in MULTILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 17 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998).
32. See 76 TAX NOTES 1 (1997) ("We have the treaty program to serve the
needs of our private sector, and we are advocates for our private sector.")
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D. Triangular Cases are Difficult or Impossible to Handle
Bilaterally.
Bilateral treaties can avoid double taxation between two
countries, but there are situations involving more than two
countries that they cannot handle, or can handle only with
difficulty. These include so-called triangular cases; for example,
where a taxpayer resident in State A has a permanent estab-
lishment or other activity in State B, and pays interest to a
taxpayer in State C, which is related to the activity in State B.
In such a case, even if there are tax treaties between each of
States A, B, and C, the normal treaty provisions will not work
because the interest will be sourced in both A and B.33 While
many aspects of triangular cases can be dealt with through
bilateral treaties, the more effective approach is a multilateral
one. 4 In the above case, it is possible for the treaties to pro-
vide that the source of the income is State B, but this may not
be appropriate where State B is not a party to tax treaties
with the other states. So-called triangular cases are the flip
side of the coin discussed above, where a taxpayer exploits a
bilateral treaty by setting up branches or subsidiaries in more
than two countries. In the (relatively rare) triangular cases,
multi-jurisdictional location decisions can lead to double taxa-
tion.
The question of how and to what extent triangular prob-
lems are in fact dealt with, or could in theory be dealt with, in
bilateral treaties is a complex one and beyond the scope of this
article.35 I think it is fair to say that, regardless of whether
these problems adequately could be dealt with bilaterally, in
practice they will not be adequately dealt with bilaterally for
the foreseeable future. Most existing treaties have limited, if
any, provisions covering triangular cases. Moreover, adequate
resolution of triangular cases would require comprehensive
treaty coverage and a harmonized approach. A multilateral
approach, therefore, seems to be the only feasible way to deal
33. See John Avery Jones et al., Tax Treaty Problems Relating to Source, 1998
BRIT. TAX REV. 222; OECD, 1992 REPORT ON TRIANGULAR CASES (1992).
34. See Nils Mattson, Multilateral Tax Treaties - A Model for the Future?, in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN TAXATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS 243, 252-55 (Gustaf
Lindencrona et al. eds., 1999).
35. See, e.g., Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 25-37; Kees van Raad, The 1992
OECD Model Treaty: Triangular Cases, 33 EUR. TAXN 298 (Sept. 1993).
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with these problems.
Beyond these perhaps unusual cases, there are a number
of important areas that simply cannot be dealt with bilaterally.
These include arrangements whereby a tax base is apportioned
among a number of countries."8 Such an arrangement could,
for example, be applied to multinationals, either globally or
partially.
E. Incomplete Coverage of Countries
While the current network of treaties covers the OECD
countries fairly comprehensively,37 it falls far short of univer-
sal coverage throughout the world. Supposing that there are,
say, 150 countries interested in being party to a comprehensive
treaty network, this would imply 11,175 treaties. Assuming
approximately 1,700 treaties now, this implies a coverage of
only about 15%. (It is even worse if one included, say, all 183
current IMF member countries, which would require 16,653
bilateral treaties.) Admittedly, some countries are not interest-
ed in developing a tax treaty network, but it appears that most
countries now have such an interest. 8 Among other reasons,
countries find entering into tax treaties attractive as a means
of encouraging international investment, obtaining better
terms for their own residents engaging in international trans-
actions, and strengthening their administrative ability to tax
non-residents or their own residents (through improved infor-
mation exchange). 9 Entering into treaties also has become
important because countries often include in their domestic tax
rules rather stringent provisions for taxing non-residents, on
the assumption that these will, by and large, be negotiated
away by treaty.0 This leaves countries who are not treaty
36. See Vann, supra note 5.
37. Out of a possible 552 bilateral treaties, the OECD member countries were
parties to 475 treaties as of 1995. See Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 3.
38. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 2 ("There is a remark-
ably broad and well-established consensus among governments of various political
and economic persuasions that it is in their interest to enter into income tax trea-
ties."). Developments since the time that statement was made bear it out, as nu-
merous transition countries in particular have vigorously moved to establish a
treaty network.
39. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 10, at 1.
40. See Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 3-4. Such stringent provisions may be
included as a bargaining chip for treaty negotiations. They also may be used as a
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partners in a disadvantaged situation.
Under a bilateral network, universal coverage is almost
impossible to achieve, because it takes substantial time to
negotiate and ratify each treaty. Moreover, smaller countries
typically do not have the resources needed to negotiate numer-
ous treaties, and may have higher priorities. Only under a
multilateral treaty could the majority of developing countries
hope to enter into an extensive tax treaty network. The current
regime, therefore, effectively precludes countries with smaller
economies from fully participating in the treaty network.
F. Problems of Interpretation and Amendment
A multilateral treaty would have the advantage of a uni-
form text,6" even if there are substantial derogations. The cur-
rent network of bilateral treaties involves substantial complex-
ity, because each treaty is a different legal instrument. There-
fore, lawyers, administrators, and courts spend a lot of energy
interpreting treaties. If the basic provisions of tax treaties
were embodied in a single multilateral treaty, interpretation
would be easier, because a common understanding would de-
velop about the meaning of the text, which also could be
amended relatively easily if ambiguities were noted.
The current treaty network suffers from several major
flaws from the point of view of interpretation.42 As with any
statute, treaties need to be interpreted when applied to specific
cases. Taxpayers and administrators seeking to apply a partic-
ular provision naturally will look to precedent-either adminis-
trative or judicial-for guidance. The difficulty with the cur-
rent situation is that because each treaty is legally on its own,
there is no guarantee that even common provisions will be
interpreted in the same way by different authorities (courts or
tax administrators) in different countries.43 This leads to con-
weapon to attack tax havens, which generally are not treaty partners. One prob-
lem with such an approach is that the affected countries include not just tax ha-
vens, but also countries that are trying to operate a normal tax system, but just
have not had the opportunity to become a treaty partner.
41. See Mattson, supra note 34, at 255.
42. See generally Kees van Raad, Interpretation and Application of Tax Trea-
ties by Tax Courts, 36 EUI TAX'N 3 (1996).
43. See Loukota, supra note 9, at 90. See also PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXA-
TION CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 39-41 (1994) (noting that there
are relatively few cases where a court refers to decisions of a foreign court in
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fusion and legal uncertainty. (The extent of the problem is
mitigated by the role of the OECD Commentary, but the com-
mentary does not cover all issues and its status involves legal
problems of its own, discussed below.)
Further confusion is caused by the fact that the language
of existing treaties sometimes varies slightly from the lan-
guage of the Model or from other treaties concluded by a par-
ticular country." The variation in language may arise from
differences in translation or just variation in wording which
may not have been carefully thought through by the treaty
negotiators (or may have been left as is, in the desire to con-
clude the negotiations). In such cases, it may not be clear
whether the wording differences should lead to a difference in
interpretation or not.
Numerous cases arise under current practice requiring
either amendment or interpretation of the OECD Model.45
Indeed, the OECD now has published the Model in a loose-leaf
format so that it can be updated periodically. The process of
amendment and interpretation is not ideal. Although the com-
mentary has been cited in judicial decisions,4" its legal effect
is unclear. The introduction to the commentary itself discusses
the significance to be given to the commentary in interpreta-
tion. While the OECD finds that the commentary "can... be
of great assistance in the application and interpretation of the
conventions," that tax officials "give great weight to the guid-
ance contained in the Commentaries," that taxpayers "make
extensive use of the Commentaries," and that they "frequently
played a key role in the judge's deliberations" when a court
was interpreting a treaty, it falls short of saying that the com-
mentaries have a legally binding effect.47 While as a matter of
policy, it clearly makes sense to use the commentaries as an
aid in interpreting treaties, the legal basis for such use as a
interpreting tax treaties).
44. See Wassermeyer, supra note 31, at 17, 29-30.
45. See, e.g., the description of items being considered by the OECD's working
party on tax treaties in Daniel Luthi, OECD Work on Tax Treaties, in THE OECD
MODEL CONVENTION: 1997 AND BEYOND (unpublished proceedings of a seminar
held in New Delhi in 1997 during the 51st Congress of the International Fiscal
Association) (on file with author).
46. See OECD, supra note 2, 29.3, at 15. See also BAKER, supra note 43, at
28-29.
47. See OECD, supra note 2, at 14-15.
1657
BROOK. J. ITTL L.
matter of public international law is elusive. 48 An additional
issue is whether amendments to the commentary can be ap-
plied with retroactive effect; i.e. to treaties negotiated before
the amendment.49 For practical reasons, it would be desirable
to do so, given the infrequency of treaty renegotiation. Other-
wise, amendments might take decades to come into effect. An
additional problem is that amendments to the Model can be
applied only to newly negotiated or renegotiated treaties.
Therefore, instead of making amendments to the Model, the
OECD tends to fix problems by creative interpretation, again
not an ideal solution because the interpretation often does
violence to the language of the Model and therefore may not
have a good legal basis.50 National courts might not agree
with it, especially where applied retroactively. To the extent
that the interpretation takes place in OECD reports that are
not included in the Commentary, it may carry even less legal
weight.
These problems can be resolved under a multilateral trea-
ty. Amendments to the treaty could be made with immediate
effect. As for interpretation, the international organization
administering the treaty could be authorized to issue legally
binding interpretations.5' Where considered desirable (such as
48. See Hugh J. Ault, The Role of the OECD Commentaries in the Interpreta-
tion of Tax Treaties, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (Herbert Alpert &
Kees van Raad eds., 1993); BAKER, supra note 43, at 28-31, advocates a "pragmat-
ic" approach, referring even to subsequent commentaries insofar as they are per-
suasive. It seems that the legal basis for the use of the Commentary can be
strengthened by mentioning the Commentary in a Memorandum of Understanding
to each treaty. See Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 19-21. However, with respect to
existing treaties this has been done only rarely, so it would take a long time for
this solution to be effective for most treaties.
49. See Ault, supra note 48. See also BAKER, supra note 43; Klaus Vogel, Tax
Treaty News, 54 BULL. INTL FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 98 (2000) (later Commentar-
ies are not "valid retroactively legally speaking"); OECD, supra note 2, 19 33-36.1,
at 16; Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 21-25. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note
11, at 54, argues that the ALI Commentary should be given "substantial weight"
on the ground that treaty negotiators should be familiar with the OECD Model as
interpreted by its commentary and should be considered to "accept the common
meaning of that language as agreed among the OECD Member countries." This
argument of course applies only to the commentary as it existed at the time of
negotiation of the treaty.
50. See Vann, supra note 5, at 108, 110 (interpretation of Model in respect to
thin capitalization).
51. Cf van Raad, supra note 42, at 6-7. See also KEES VAN RAAD, INTERNA-
TIONAL COORDINATION OF TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION (forthcom-
ing 2001) (proposing creation of a body within the OECD which could give non-
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in cases where the interpretation sets forth a new view of the
treaty) the interpretation could be given prospective effect; i.e.
it could apply to transactions occurring after the new interpre-
tation is issued.52 This is not an option in the case of the cur-
rent OECD commentary. Either this must be applied on a
prospective basis only, in which case it will not apply to trea-
ties negotiated before the amendment (as opposed to transac-
tions occurring before the amendment), or it must be applied
retroactively (i.e. to all open tax years). There is no possibility
of a middle ground.
G. Incomplete Coverage of Taxes
The bilateral treaty network mostly covers income taxes.
While there is an OECD model treaty on estates, inheritances,
and gifts," the treaty network in this area is quite sparse and
a multilateral effort may be the only feasible means to achieve
a broad coverage to eliminate double taxation of capital trans-
fer taxes.54 Capital transfer taxes also can involve triangular
situations (such as where an individual is domiciled in two
states and a third state is a situs state). These better can be
dealt with through a multilateral treaty. Social security taxes
are the subjects of some treaties, but this network too is quite
sparse.
Tax coordination with respect to the VAT is done mostly
within the EU. There currently is no mechanism for coordina-
tion of VAT issues outside the EU. While indirect taxes raise
fewer issues of international coordination, they are not insig-
nificant, and are growing in importance with the rise of e-com-
merce, for example. Interestingly, indirect taxes have, in sever-
al cases, been dealt with successfully by multilateral treaties.
binding advisory opinions at the request of national tax courts). I would argue
that the proposal advanced here would be more effective than that of van Raad,
because national courts generally are not in the habit of asking others for advisory
opinions.
52. The possibility of giving prospective effect only to an interpretation explic-
itly should be provided for in the multilateral agreement. Cf I.R.C. § 7805(b)
(2000) (allowing retroactive effect of regulations in certain cases).
53. OECD, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON ESTATES AND INHERI-
TANCES AND ON GIFTs (1982).
54. See Derek Devgun, Multilateral Capital Transfer Tax Treaty Relief Within
the European Community, 20 EuR. L. REV. 451, 457 (1995).
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The most prominent case is customs duties.5 Multilateral
agreements cover a whole host of issues in customs and sub-
stantial harmonization has been achieved with customs legisla-
tion.
Given the number of treaties that would be required, it
virtually would be impossible to negotiate on a bilateral basis
the treaties required to cover all taxes other than the income
tax. However, it would be manageable to do this on a multilat-
eral basis.
H. Inflexibility
Paradoxically, as the network of bilateral treaties becomes
more successful, it also becomes increasingly inflexible and,
therefore, weaker over time. 6 Changes need to be made to
treaties for a number of reasons. Changes to national tax laws,
which may be made for domestic reasons, often call for con-
forming changes to treaties. Changes in the international eco-
nomic environment can make existing treaties obsolete. For
example, as the status of countries as capital importers or
exporters shifts, so may their treaty stance. 7 Technical flaws
in treaties are often detected, sometimes as the result of their
application to new circumstances. The OECD periodically rec-
ommends changes to its Model tax treaty.58 However, it is
quite difficult to make frequent changes in the current network
of treaties, because changes would involve renegotiation of
existing treaties, and this occurs on average only at lengthy
intervals. The consequence in the case of a change to the
OECD Model is that the-old and new provisions will exist side-
by-side for a number of years. This is confusing and unsatisfac-
tory. Finally, a fundamental policy change is almost impossible
to make, given that countries are locked into the paradigm
inherent in the existing treaty network. For example, it has
been realized for a long time that the existing approach of
treaties suffers from an artificiality in distinguishing among
55. See Williams, supra note 4, [ 444-446, at 89-90.
56. See id. 1[ 402-403, at 77-78.
57. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 2, at 10 (noting shift in status of certain
countries).
58. See, e.g., OECD, ISSUES RELATED TO ARTICLE 14 OF THE OECD MODEL
TAX CONvENTION (2000); OECD, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CON-
VENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS (1999).
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different types of income, which can be exploited by taxpayers
by recharacterizing income, and which leads to problems of
application of treaties.59 It is nearly impossible to deal with
this problem under the current framework. In addition, the
bilateral approach rules out solutions (such as apportionment)
that would require multilateral agreement.
The existing inflexible network of treaties cannot hope to
handle the dynamic economic changes that are putting pres-
sure on tax administrations. These changes take the form of
increasing globalization-which makes for a decreased connec-
tion between taxable transactions and particular coun-
tries-and financial innovation-which challenges the existing
legal categories on which tax rules (particularly those in trea-
ties) are based. In order to be able to hope to respond to the
challenges of globalization and financial innovation, tax policy
officials must keep thinking and innovating even without tak-
ing international aspects into account. It is difficult enough to
amend national tax legislation to respond to these challenges.
But, to amend bilateral tax treaties on a timely basis virtually
is impossible. This will be an ongoing issue. Tax treaties must
be able to respond flexibly to changing decisions of national
policymakers. Bilateral treaties simply are inadequate struc-
tures to accomplish this task. What is needed is a multilateral
treaty with an ongoing process for revision and amendment.
Far from serving as a means of dealing with tax policy
challenges, the existing network often impedes innovative
solutions. When treaties stand in the way, some countries have
resorted to treaty overrides. A more desirable approach would
be to agree on the necessary amendments to treaties, some-
thing that can be accomplished more readily in a multilateral
context.
I. Treaty Shopping
Under a network of bilateral treaties, the terms of which
are different, treaty shopping is always a problem. Whenever a
country provides more favorable rules for certain treaty part-
ners, an incentive is created for investors to use or establish
companies in those treaty partners, rather than making the
investment through a company located in a treaty partner with
59. See, e.g., Avery Jones, supra note 4, at 12-17.
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a less favorable provision. The bilateral approach invites the
treaty shopping problem because the principle of reciprocity in
treaty negotiation ("do ut des") leads to differences in treaties
arising out of different negotiations. Different treaties involve
a package of different concessions. To some extent this problem
is being taken care of by the insertion of most-favored-nation
clauses into treaties (the automatic extension of favored terms
that the treaty partner grants to anyone else). But not all such
treaties have such clauses. The problem of treaty shopping
would not go away under a multilateral treaty, but it should be
much diminished, because a multilateral treaty would be nego-
tiated with a global view.
IV. FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
A. Introduction
Although I tend to be an idealist, I would not pretend that
just because a multilateral treaty makes sense it will be easy
to broker the necessary political agreement. Experience with
tax policy suggests, however, that just because a reform is
considered politically impossible, does not mean it will not
happen." Currently, a number of favorable factors help set
the scene for a multilateral agreement, making it more likely
than in earlier periods.
B. Success of the OECD Model
Paradoxically, the very success of the OECD Model for a
bilateral treaty has made it propitious to replace the bilateral
network with a multilateral treaty. The increased number of
bilateral treaties makes it time consuming to make amend-
ments, thereby making the bilateral network less flexible as
more and more bilateral treaties are concluded.
The end of the Cold War also has contributed to the devel-
opment of a number of so-called transition countries. For the
most part, these countries are eager to enter into tax treaties.
However, for many of these countries the necessary personnel
60. When I was at the Treasury Department in 1984 working on the propos-
als that led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, many considered the possibility of
fundamental reform to be a pipe dream, but it happened, even though not all
desirable elements finally were included.
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with the skills to negotiate tax treaties are in short supply,
and frankly, these resources would be better devoted to im-
provement of tax administration. Even industrialized countries
have a limited tax treaty negotiating staff, so that building a
full network of bilateral treaties that would include the transi-
tion countries would take considerable time. By contrast, they
could accede much more readily to a multilateral treaty. A
multilateral framework appears to be the only realistic way to
bring the transition countries into the tax treaty network.
Moreover, including these countries in a multinational tax
organization would help them strengthen their tax administra-
tions and adopt the best taxation practices.
C. The Demands of European Law
European law protects the freedom of movement of em-
ployees, the freedom of establishment of companies, the free
movement of services, and the free movement of capital (so-
called fundamental freedoms).6 European law prohibits mem-
ber countries from discriminating against non-residents in
such a manner as to violate these fundamental freedoms. Such
prohibition applies to a member's treaty law as well as to do-
mestic law." The bilateral treaty network to which EU mem-
ber countries are parties may not be compatible with European
law. Considering, first, treaties among EU member states,
these treaties tend, by their nature, to be discriminatory be-
cause the terms of the treaties that a given member state has
with other member states are different. Discrimination against
residents of other member states also can arise from treaties
that a member state has with non-members. For example,
Germany's treaty with the United States has an anti-treaty-
shopping clause. The result of such a clause is that a German
resident could be denied the benefits of the treaty if it is owned
by non-residents. This is clearly discriminatory against capital
ownership by non-residents.63 The distortionary effect of dif-
61. See Albert J. Rdler, Most-Favored Nation Concept in Tax Treaties, in
MULTILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 3,
10 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998). See also Sture Bergstr6m, Restrictions on Free
Movement and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in EC Law and the Implications
for Income Taxation, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN TAXATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS
45 (Gustaf Lindencrona et al. eds., 1999).
62. See BAKER, supra note 43, at 60-62.
63. See KLAUS VOGEL, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME, HARMONIZATION,
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fering treaties is magnified (somewhat paradoxically) by steps
that the EU has taken to increase the freedom of movement
within the Community." Thus, the parent-subsidiary direc-
tive has eliminated withholding taxes for dividends paid to a
parent company. This means that European companies can
establish a subsidiary in any other member country without a
tax disincentive. The fact that member countries have different
treaty terms with the outside world means that European
companies will now have an incentive to treaty shop within
Europe. The combination of the parent-subsidiary directive and
the existence of differences in treaties that EU members have
with other countries creates a distortion in favor of establish-
ing subsidiaries in countries with favorable treaties. This kind
of tax-induced location distortion is exactly the problem the
parent-subsidiary directive was supposed to eliminate. Clearly,
harmonization of treaty policy would be desirable as a means
of bringing about a common market within Europe.'
Because of the complexity of jurisprudence involving dis-
crimination (sometimes discrimination can be justified), and
because of the limited number of cases that the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has considered, the precise require-
ments of European law in this area have yet to be worked
out."6 Recently, however, the ECJ came out with a clear deci-
sion that European Law prohibits discrimination in tax trea-
ties. The court stated that
[In the case of a double-taxation treaty concluded be-
tween a Member State and a non-member country, the na-
tional treatment principle requires the Member State which
is party to the treaty to grant to permanent establishments of
non-resident companies the advantages provided for by that
treaty on the same conditions as those which apply to resi-
dent companies. 7
AND TAX NEUTRALITY UNDER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 15 (1994).
64. See RAMON J. JEFFERY, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 144 (1999).
65. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION 31, n.1, 206, 378 (1992).
66. See generally THE COMPATIBILITY OF ANTI-ABUSE PROVISIONS IN TAX TREA-
TIES wrTH EC LAW (Peter Essers et al. eds., 1998); Rene Offermanns & Carlo
Romano, Treaty Benefits for Permanent Establishments: The Saint-Gobain Case, 40
EUR. TAX'N 180 (2000); TAX TREATIES AND EC LAW (Wolfgang Gassner et al. eds.,
1997).
67. Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutsch-
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The court gave short shrift to the argument that the dis-
crimination could be justified as part of the bargaining process
in negotiating treaties: "that double-taxation treaties are based
on the principle of reciprocity and that the balance inherent in
such treaties would be disturbed if the benefit of their provi-
sions was extended to companies established in Member States
which were not parties to them."68 The court answered this
argument simply by observing that "the Member States never-
theless may not disregard Community rules." 9
Given that it would be a diversion from the main theme of
this article, and in light of the embryonic state of European
law in this area, I will not speculate further precisely how the
ECJ might apply the principles of European law to treaties.
Based on the existing jurisprudence, however, it seems reason-
ably safe to assume that future ECJ decisions will hold that
the existing treaty network violates European Law in several
respects."0 Accordingly, it appears quite possible that the tax
treaties of EU members (including those entered into with non-
member countries) will have to be replaced with a single multi-
lateral treaty in order to conform to European law.7' It is
even possible that the EU itself has acquired competence to
negotiate tax treaties in areas directly concerned with the
parent-subsidiary directive or other areas where the EU has
acted to implement European law.72 Whatever the precise
land v. Finanzamt, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6161.
68. Id. 55.
69. Id. 57.
70. See Essers et al, supra note 66, at 209-13.
71. See R;dler, supra note 61; Wassermeyer, supra note 31; COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 65, at 378-79. In the Saint-Gobain case,
the ECJ ruled that a German branch of a French company was entitled to the
same benefits under the U.S.-German treaty as German companies. In particular,
the treaty provided for exemption by Germany of dividends subject to tax in the
United States which were paid to German capital companies. The court found that
St. Gobain's German permanent establishment was entitled to this exemption. See
Saint-Gebain, C-307/97. In effect, therefore, a French company was obtaining the
benefits of the German treaty. Little by little, therefore, the ECJ already seems to
be eroding the bilateral nature of the current treaty network.
72. See JEFFERY, supra note 64, at 145-68. This theory is supported by a
statement in the Saint-Gobain decision: "in the absence of unifying or harmonising
measures adopted in the Community, in particular under the second indent of
Article 220 of the EC Treaty (now the second indent of Article 293 EC), the Mem-
ber States remain competent to determine the criteria for taxation of income and
wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation by means, inter alia, of interna-
tional agreements." See Saint-Gobain, C-307/97. The parent-subsidiary directive is,
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scope of the legal doctrine that emerges in this area, it appears
that the current treaty network violates, in a number of re-
spects, the principle of non-discrimination, and that, as a mat-
ter of policy, the conclusion by EU members of a single multi-
lateral treaty would be desirable as a matter of furthering the
fundamental freedoms. If the EU members determine to do so,
this would require renegotiation of the majority of the bilateral
treaties currently in force. This would constitute an excellent
opportunity to replace the current bilateral network with a
multilateral treaty. Put another way, negotiations to form a
multilateral treaty would provide the EU member countries
with an escape from the problem they currently face: The pos-
sible illegality of the current treaty network on the one hand,
and considerable political inertia on the other hand.
Of course, as with any major tax reform, there will be
political obstacles to accomplishing a revision of the existing
EU treaty network. In particular, the renegotiation of bilateral
treaties between EU members and non-member countries on a
common basis will not be an easy task. In some cases, such
treaties are the basis for corporate structures designed to mini-
mize taxation by using tax havens.73 Such structures present
an opportunity for reform, in the sense of reducing the use of
tax havens, but such reform can be expected to be resisted by
those who benefit from the current system.
D. Willingness for Multilateral Cooperation
Recently, the OECD countries have undertaken several
initiatives that suggest an increased willingness to cooperate
in the tax area on a multilateral basis. The OECD published a
report on harmful tax practices and has undertaken to combat
harmful tax competition. A similar initiative has been taken
within the EU. The OECD countries also obtained agreement
on a report on bank secrecy which involves a commitment to
broaden the exchange of information. An effort is underway to
provide for an automatic exchange of information on interest
income of non-residents. The EU has reached agreement in
of course, such a harmonizing measure. Thus, the ECJ suggested that the indi-
vidual EU member countries have lost competency in this regard, although it did
not spell out precisely what this means.
73. For example, the Netherlands Antilles, which has a treaty with the Neth-
erlands. See GINSBERG, supra note 14, at 12-15.
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principle on a regime for the taxation of interest income of
non-residents, involving a combination of information exchange
and a withholding tax (to be imposed by certain countries for a
limited period), but a multilateral agreement involving non-EU
OECD member countries may be needed to bring this agree-
ment into effect. 4 The details of these efforts are not relevant
here. What is of interest is that these various initiatives show
that the major industrialized countries seem interested in
building a multilateral framework for taxation. What is needed
is to undertake a more systematic approach.
E. Pressure from Globalization
Increased globalization and the pressure that this places
on countries' tax systems has become commonplace. There
seems little doubt that the extent of international transactions
is increasing and that there is a resulting pressure on tax
revenue because international transactions afford an opportu-
nity to reduce tax; whether by legal or illegal means.75 Thus,
the urgency of fashioning a multilateral framework for cooper-
ation has increased compared with what it was 10, 20, or 30
years ago.
V. PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR A MULTILATERAL TREATY
A. General Structure
The proposed multilateral treaty would replace the exist-
ing network of tax treaties with a single multi-part treaty.
(The existing treaties would remain in force during a transi-
tion period.) The first part would be a common template for
bilateral treaties, initially based on the OECD Model. The
second part would be a multilateral treaty, based on the tem-
plate in part one, but adjusted to take account of its multilat-
eral nature. (This part would not be subscribed to by all coun-
tries, at least initially.) The third part, which could evolve over
74. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1667-69; Speech of Frits Bolkenstein
(Sept. 25, 2000) ("It was also agreed that discussions should take place with the
U.S. and certain key countries, such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andor-
ra, and San Marino in order to promote the adoption of equivalent measures in
these countries and thus preserve the competitiveness of European financial mar-
ketis].").
75. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1597-1603.
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time, would contain general undertakings for cooperation in
international taxation (for example, non-discrimination, re-
fraining from unfair tax competition, or agreements on infor-
mation sharing). The fourth part of the treaty would be institu-
tional, providing for an international organization to adminis-
ter the treaty and for procedures. Finally, derogations and
transitional arrangements would provide a bridge between the
existing treaty network and part one of the agreement.
B. Common Text Based on OECD Model
The idea of part one of the agreement would be to replace
the existing network of bilateral treaties with a single text.
This would result in a dramatic simplification of the existing
legal verbiage (which takes several volumes in print form) and
would provide benefits, as discussed above, in the form of a
common text which could be subject to common interpretation
and, by agreement, amendment. Given peculiarities in national
tax systems and in bilateral relations, it is not expected that
all divergences between the common text and bilateral treaties
can be eliminated. Therefore, there would be a substantial
network of derogations. Over time, it is hoped that the extent
of derogations would be limited to those that truly are neces-
sary. For example, minor differences in wording, which do not
reflect strongly held national policy views, should give way in
favor of the benefits of uniformity.
A proposed text for a multilateral tax treaty recently has
been drafted by a group headed by Michael Lang.76 This
group decided to make only minimal changes to the existing
OECD treaty, because "it is easier to implement a multilateral
tax treaty if the draft is based on familiar notions."" Certain-
ly, it makes sense to base the treaty text on the OECD Model
if it is desired to fold the existing bilateral treaties into a com-
mon text. However, it seems unduly cautious to refrain from
making any changes at all. Surely some drafting improvements
could be made without departing from "familiar notions." De-
cades of experience with treaties based on the OECD Model
76. See Michael Lang et al., Draft for a Multilateral Tax Treaty, in MULTILAT-
ERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 197 (Michael
Lang et al. ed., 1998).
77. Id. at 193.
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have generated substantial commentary suggesting technical
changes; sometimes arising from differences between the Eng-
lish and French texts of the Model.7" It should be possible to
reach agreement on changes which clearly improve the existing
text. Indeed, the prospect of such improvements should be one
of the motivating factors in favor of a multilateral agreement.
Even if no changes were made to the existing text of the OECD
Model, the resulting template would reflect technical amend-
ments agreed upon by the OECD members; which are reflected
in existing treaties only to a limited extent because of the slow
pace of negotiation and renegotiation. Undoubtedly, there are
many other proposed technical changes in the pipeline which
could be incorporated into the uniform text. Ideally, a small
team with expertise in drafting and experience with the trea-
ties currently in force would be appointed by the negotiators to
formulate a text. The text prepared by the group headed by
Lang certainly could be taken as a starting point by this team,
but hopefully substantial improvements could be made even
while sticking to "familiar notions." While it is tempting to
offer suggestions, I refrain from doing so here because the
draft text will be the result of negotiation and the drafting
instructions will have to be determined as a political matter by
those involved in the negotiation, in order to accommodate the
various interests concerned and to achieve an agreement.
I will make only two general observations. First, it would
be desirable from the point of view of simplicity and legal cer-
tainty to have the official text in only one language. Alterna-
tively, the number of official languages should be kept to a
minimum, as was done for the WTO agreement.79 In fact, if
the text carefully is drafted in each official language (and not
just translated), the existence of more than one language actu-
ally might facilitate interpretation, since an ambiguity in one
-version of the text might be cured by consulting another ver-
sion. Multilingual drafting would require a substantial input of
time and skill into the preparation of a multilingual text, how-
ever, but this should be manageable because the text is not
very long. If such care is not used, then the use of more than
78. See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones et al., The Non-Discrimination Article in
Tax Treaties, 1991 BRIT. TAX REV. 359.
79. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1998).
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one language easily can lead to contradictions in the text.
Second, it would be desirable to include in the text stan-
dard options for certain provisions. The purpose of including
standard options is to bring deviations from the standard text
as far as possible into a uniform format. A key source for such
options would be the UN Model. Not all provisions of the UN
Model necessarily need be included as options, but at least
those provisions which have gained a reasonable degree of
acceptance in actual treaty practice should be included.0 In
addition, other provisions that are found with sufficient fre-
quency in bilateral treaty practice could be included as options.
C. Multilateral Version of Common Text
The common text described above would become a tem-
plate for existing (when converted) and future bilateral trea-
ties. In addition, some countries may be prepared to enter into
a multilateral treaty. This would have the same text as the
bilateral template, but with some additions and revisions that
are peculiar to its multilateral nature.8 ' For example, there
would be provisions for dealing with triangular cases and there
would be provisions for resolution of treaty residence where,
absent the treaty, an individual would be treated as a resident
of more than one of the contracting states. In addition, as with
the existing Nordic treaty, there would be provisions specific to
each contracting State, whether in the main text or in proto-
cols. The reason for this dual arrangement (combination of a
single multilateral treaty and bilateral treaties) is that not all
countries will be willing to join a multilateral treaty. For one
thing, some countries may not be ready to be a treaty partner
with all the other countries that are party to the multilateral
treaty. Given the requirements of European law discussed
above, it is to be expected that the core for the multilateral
treaty would be the EU member countries.' Perhaps initially,
80. See generally Willem Wijnen & Marco Magenta, The UN Model in Prac-
tice, 51 BuLL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 574 (1997) (survey of the extent of
the reflection of 22 specific provisions of the UN Model in 811 treaties concluded
between 1980 and 1997).
81. See Mattson, supra note 34, at 248-52.
82. See id. at 243.
83. For a review of the existing bilateral treaties between EU member coun-
tries, see Gerald Toifl, The Bilateral Tax Treaties Concluded between EU Member
States, in MULTILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
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in order to simplify negotiation, it would be ambitious enough
for the multilateral treaty to apply to these countries alone. In
addition, it may be possible for the EU members to enter into
largely common bilateral treaties (based on the agreed tem-
plate, but allowing for deviations in each case depending on
the negotiating position) with non-EU countries. Such a set-up,
with a common multilateral treaty for the EU and largely
common external bilateral treaties, would help preserve these
treaties from challenge on the basis of European law.
I do not see the possibility, without inordinate complexity,
for a multilateral treaty to work unless each party to the trea-
ty agrees to be a partner with each other country. Otherwise,
one may get the following type of problem. Suppose that coun-
tries A, B, and C are parties to the treaty, and that countries
C, D, and E are parties inter sese (i.e. of this group, only C is
willing to be a partner with A and B). There might be an indi-
vidual with residence in A, C, and E with a resulting conflict
under the treaties (under one treaty, only A might have the
right to tax this individual as a resident and under the other
treaty only E might have this right). Similar problems can be
envisaged for permanent establishments.
On the other hand, more than one multilateral treaty
mutually could coexist with minimal technical problems. Thus,
it may be that the European countries could agree on a multi-
lateral treaty and that there would be other multilateral trea-
ties in other regions.
The key to coexistence of these treaties is that all of
them-multilateral or bilateral-would be based on the same
template and interpreted by the same agency.
D. General Undertakings
There are many possibilities for countries to reach general
agreements to improve the coordination of their tax systems.
With respect to jurisdiction to tax, countries could undertake
not to expand their jurisdictions too aggressively. Of course,
this matter already would be taken care of to some extent by
part one of the agreement, but there may be additional areas,
for example, not involving the income tax, in which countries
could agree to limit their taxing authority so as to avoid double
TAX LAW 55 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998).
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taxation. Another possible target for agreement is elimination
of discrimination in taxation, possibly going beyond the com-
mitments in the existing OECD Model text. On the other side
of the coin, countries could undertake to not engage in harmful
tax practices; i.e. not to provide unduly favorable tax regimes
aimed at appropriating for themselves a portion of the tax base
that rightly belongs to other countries. While all but two of the
OECD countries have made a commitment to avoid harmful
tax practices, this commitment is not legally binding.'
Whether an undertaking to refrain from harmful tax practices
could be formulated in such a way as to attract sufficient
agreement remains to be seen. But, this is a matter that a
multilateral tax agreement should take up and keep on the
agenda even if an immediate agreement cannot be reached.
The existing OECD Model only has minimal provisions
concerning treaty shopping and treaty abuse generally. On the
other hand, a number of bilateral treaties do contain such
provisions and there also are anti-abuse provisions in domestic
law that may apply to treaties. While it may not be possible at
the beginning to reach agreement on rules in this area,
strengthened anti-abuse provisions eventually could be includ-
ed in the multilateral treaty."
A number of problems currently arise because of technical
inconsistencies in the tax laws of different countries.86 For
example, there are conflicting definitions of residence for both
companies and individuals. There are differences in character-
ization of companies, so that a single entity may be taxed on a
flow-through basis in one jurisdiction and as a separate entity
in another jurisdiction. There are differences in characteriza-
tion of debt and leases. It would be quite useful if countries
could agree on common definitions and treatments in these
areas and a select few others. This would go a long way toward
cutting back on artificial international tax planning transac-
tions and would contribute to the simplification and rational-
ization of national tax laws. It does not seem beyond the realm
of possibility that such an agreement on selective harmoniza-
tion could be reached. For example, common rules to distin-
guish a finance lease from an operating lease could be agreed
84. See OECD, supra note 20, at 8.
85. See JEFFERY, supra note 64, at 114-17.
86. See supra section III.B.
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upon, with a finance lease being treated not as a lease but as a
loan. For example, substantial harmonization of rules has been
achieved in the customs area.
A further possible commitment is one of cooperation in tax
administration. This includes, for example, sharing information
and developing the administrative capacity to do so more effec-
tively. In a more general sense, cooperation means a commit-
ment to set up procedures and approaches whereby each coun-
try sees itself as contributing to an effective worldwide admin-
istration of the taxes which each country imposes. To the ex-
tent that taxpayers seek to take advantage of international
transactions to avoid tax, tax administrations should be work-
ing together to assure that these transactions lead to similar
tax burdens as those arising from purely domestic transac-
tions. Ideally and eventually, the existing multilateral agree-
ment on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters (cur-
rently in force among only seven countries) 7 would become
part of the multilateral treaty. If this is not possible, some
provisions could be lifted from that agreement, with the fuller
agreement being applicable to a more limited number of coun-
tries. In this context, it would be desirable to include in the
treaty (whether initially or by subsequent agreement) a provi-
sion for enforcement of tax debts.88
There is scope in the indirect tax area for countries to
reach multilateral agreements to eliminate double taxation 9
or to plug holes that exist in the current tax net. For example,
international passenger transport (including direct inputs such
as airplane fuel) is commonly exempt from VAT or sales taxes.
In the case of goods, it is appropriate for exports to be zero
rated, because the goods will be taxed on import in the country
of destination. In the case of services such as international
transport, however, the result is a zero rate of tax. While any
one country may be reluctant for competitive reasons to tax
international transport, countries could do so if they agree.
87. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, reprinted
in RuFus RHOADES & MARSHALL LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED
TRANSACTIONS § 85.00 (1995).
88. See JEFFERY, supra note 64, at 127-31.
89. See KNECHTLE, supra note 6, at 189 (reporting on multilateral convention
of 1956 on taxation of motor vehicles, subscribed to by 30 states, under which
motor vehicles would be taxed only in the state of registration).
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More generally, international services pose a point of difficulty
for the VAT, precisely because of the lack of correspondence
with goods-if the exporting country zero rates the supply, the
importing country will not necessarily tax it. A general regime
for cross-border services may need international agreement to
be established, because cooperation of both countries involved
in a transaction may be required for taxation to be effective.
Cigarette taxation presents another possibility for interna-
tional agreement. Currently, exports are typically zero rated
for excise purposes, while imports are taxed. However, there
are serious compliance issues in many countries with collecting
cigarette excises on import. If countries could agree to impose
a uniform minimum tax on exports (which could be creditable
in the country of import), the problem of cigarette smuggling
would be reduced and revenues from this source would in-
crease. The revenues could be transferred to the importing
country under a clearinghouse arrangement. Another example
is duty free shops. Again, the principle of zero rating for ex-
ports is applied, but the import typically is not subject to tax
because of de minimis exemptions. If countries could agree to
refrain from allowing favorable regimes for duty free sales (and
could regulate sales occurring in international air or water
space-the regime of either the country of origin or of destina-
tion could apply), the somewhat anomalous and inefficient
practice of duty free shopping could be eliminated. Internet
sales are of course another topic on which international agree-
ment would be possible. I don't believe that any of these topics
necessarily should be included in the initial round of negotia-
tions on a multilateral tax treaty; they are raised here just as
illustrations of possible future agenda topics. My point here is
simply to illustrate that there would be a substantial agenda of
indirect tax issues to take up under the framework of a multi-
lateral agreement.
Tax treaties protect, to a certain extent, against a
country's overassertion of tax jurisdiction on a bilateral basis,
but they do not do so multilaterally, and do not protect against
cases where a country is engaging in harmful tax competition.
Trade agreements, by contrast, do protect against harmful
competition in the form of export subsidies. It will be a contro-
versial issue whether-and to what extent-a multilateral tax
instrument should attempt to impose on countries an interna-
tional tax order and how the applicable rules are to be coordi-
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nated with trade agreements. Perhaps the best way to proceed
is for a multilateral treaty initially to contain only minimal
restrictions on the tax policy autonomy of countries, for exam-
ple, non-discrimination provisions and exchange of information
agreements, and then leave other possible undertakings, such
as prohibition of harmful tax competition, for further discus-
sion and agreement.
A multilateral treaty could, therefore, be seen as the estab-
lishment of a process and of a framework for future discussion
and agreement, rather than as establishing a full set of rules
ab initio.
E. An International Organization to Administer the Treaty
1. Membership and Structure
The multilateral treaty should designate an organization
charged with enforcing, promoting, and interpreting the treaty,
proposing amendments, and, more generally, promoting inter-
governmental cooperation in taxation.0 While the OECD cur-
rently plays this role to some extent, it is not ideally suited for
it. For one thing, the OECD has limited membership, given its
limited membership.
Given the political nature of the question, I do not believe
that it is useful for me to discuss extensively what existing or
new agency might be entrusted with this task. If a sufficient
international consensus develops to negotiate a multilateral
tax treaty and entrust its administration to an appropriate
agency, whichever agency is chosen will be an outcome of the
90. See John V. Surr, Interta: Intergovernmental Cooperation in Taxation, 7
HARV. INTL L.J. 179 (1966) (suggesting the creation of an international organi-
zation oriented toward administrative cooperation in tax matters); UNITED NATIONS
DEP'T OF DI ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVEL-
OPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, EIGHTH REPORT (1980) (recommending a study
for the establishment of a direct tax cooperation council, consisting of high officials
of national tax administrations, and supported by a secretariat). An organization
for international tax cooperation also has been suggested by Vito Tanzi. See Vito
Tanzi, Is There a Need for a World Tax Organization?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM PUBLIC ENEMIES 173 (Assaf Razin &
Efraim Sadka eds., 1999) [hereinafter Tanzi 1999]; VITO TANZI, POLICIES, INSTITU-
TIONS AND THE DARK SIDE OF ECONOMICS 224-27 (2000). Asif Qureshi has suggest-
ed the creation of "an international deliberative assembly (with universal member-
ship (contra the OECD)) in tax matters." ASIF H. QURESHI, THE PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF TAXATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 8-9 (1994).
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negotiation process. Certainly, a number of existing agencies
could be considered, including the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO). The
WTO's flexible structure could be adapted to include a Council
on taxation, and its subject matter already involves taxation to
a significant extent. Placing tax within the umbrella of the
WTO would make for a more sophisticated approach to tax
within the context of policing restrictions on export subsidies,
for example. 1 Another possibility would be to expand the
WCO from customs to include all of taxation (customs being a
form of tax). If the WCO or WTO were not chosen, they would
in any event offer lessons for structuring the new organization,
and the new organization would have to cooperate closely with
these organizations.
Whatever body is chosen (an existing body or a new body),
membership eventually should be nearly universal, but should
be conditioned on the satisfaction of specified criteria, as well
of course as adherence to the treaty. Not all countries will wish
to cooperate by becoming members.
Because each country has a sovereign right to tax, each
country should have a representative in this world body. The
appropriate representative would be the highest official in
charge of tax policy or tax administration-typically the fi-
nance minister or the minister in charge of the tax adminis-
tration in countries where there is a separate ministry. If the
WTO is used, provision will have to be made for separate rep-
resentation, perhaps by creating a separate Council under the
WTO umbrella for this purpose.
A one-country one-vote arrangement seems to have worked
both for the WTO and the WCO. Such a rule is consistent with
each country's sovereignty. In practice, a sufficient consensus
has been developed before WTO decisions have been taken. An
additional supermajority requirement on the basis of weighted
voting could be layered on top of this (e.g., decisions would
have to attract a majority of the total votes as well as a majori-
ty of the votes of countries with substantial economies).
The tax staff of the organization should, of course, be in-
91. See generally Justus Fischer-Zernin, GATT versus Tax Treaties? The Basic
Conflicts Between International Taxation Methods and the Rules and Concepts of
GATT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 39 (1987); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation,
26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1621 (2001).
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ternational in character. It should be drawn from tax experts
of all countries, and it would be desirable for a substantial
portion of the staff to be drawn from the ministries of finance
and tax administrations of the member countries. While there
should be a permanent staff to provide some continuity, it
would be important to provide a rotating element for the staff
in order to maintain the cooperative character of the organiza-
tion. Thus, the staff would benefit from an immediate knowl-
edge of practices in the tax administrations of their own coun-
tries. At the same time, the highest standards should be ap-
plied for selection of the staff.
2. Functions 2
The organization should be a general forum for discussion
of the operation of the international tax system, i.e. the system
for taxing international transactions. Its staff should conduct
studies, including statistical studies, on how the system is
working, and propose solutions. This should include identifica-
tion of cases of harmful tax competition and other cases where
actions by individual countries were having negative effects on
the operation of the international tax system and working
toward solutions. In general, the organization should inherit
the agenda of the OECD in the tax area. It should continue to
do what the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs is currently
doing, but on an enhanced basis.
As noted above, it would be important to give to the orga-
nization a power to interpret the treaty. A power of interpreta-
tion already is part of the WTO agreement.93 This would be
an important improvement over the existing situation with the
OECD commentary, since the interpretation would be legally
binding. The organization would provide a forum for continu-
ous review of experience with the treaty. It would encourage
the renegotiation of existing agreements to bring them into
line with the treaty, including serving as a forum for multilat-
eral negotiations (a country could renegotiate simultaneously a
set of existing treaties with other countries). It would deal with
problems of interpretation and application of the treaty and
would try to find solutions by way of issuing reports, issuing
92. See also Tanzi 1999, supra note 90, at 173, 184-85.
93. See JACKSON, supra note 79, at 44.
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formal interpretations of the treaty, and proposing amend-
ments to the treaty text for ratification by the members.
Interpretations would be of general applicability and
would not resolve specific disputes. It would be possible to
grant jurisdiction over disputes arising in application of the
treaty to an international court." However, there is likely to
be insufficient political consensus to include such an approach
in the initial version of the multilateral agreement. Most like-
ly, countries would prefer for their own courts to consider ap-
plication of the treaty in specific cases. A provision for arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes among one or more countries, in line
with provisions included in recent tax treaties, appropriately
would be included in the agreement."
While the primary focus of the organization would be to
facilitate the operation of the international tax system, it also
should deal more broadly with taxation, including purely do-
mestic issues. To some extent this would be inevitable, since it
is impossible to completely separate the international and
domestic aspects of tax systems. On purely domestic taxation,
however, the organization should be more of an observer and
technical advisor rather than interfering in countries' decisions
on tax policy. The organization should gather information on
how the tax systems of its member countries operate, including
data of a statistical, economic, and legal nature. It should pro-
vide technical assistance to its member countries upon request
in the areas of tax policy, revenue estimation, and tax adminis-
tration. In order to provide such. assistance in a professional
manner, its staff should develop an expertise in international
and comparative tax law and analysis. While the staff should
not get too large, it should be adequate to deal with its respon-
sibilities. It could take over most of the technical assistance
and training functions in the tax area that currently are scat-
tered among a number of agencies.
The organization should become a leader in comparative
tax law and policy analysis. It should collect and publish the
tax legislation of member countries and lead the effort in im-
proving this legislation at a technical level. As part of its task
94. See Mario ZOger, Mutual Agreement and Arbitration Procedure in a Multi-
lateral Tax Treaty, in MULTILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL TAX LAW 155 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 1998).
95. See id. at 159-67.
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of interpreting and evaluating the multilateral treaty, it should
collect and publish judicial decisions and scholarly writings on
tax treaty interpretation.96 It should assist countries in com-
piling revenue statistics and publish compilations of the statis-
tics. The organization should publish periodic reports on devel-
opments in taxation, "presenting statistics, describing main
trends (both statistically and in terms of policy developments),
identifying problems, and perhaps pointing toward feasible
solutions for those problems."97
In addition to providing technical assistance in improving
domestic tax administration to member countries with weaker
administrative capacities, the organization should become a
center for international cooperation in tax administration. It
actively should facilitate the cooperation of administrations in
areas such as information exchange," joint audits, resolution
of transfer pricing cases, and other cooperative efforts to stem
tax avoidance and evasion, particularly where international
transactions are involved. In so doing, the organization should
work closely with regional groupings of tax administrators,
providing support to them as appropriate.
The organization could, of course, also become a forum for
formal resolution of disputes among countries, as is the WTO
for trade disputes. A dispute-resolution role probably should
not be included in an original draft of a multilateral treaty, for
fear of being too ambitious at the beginning. An alternative
would be to provide for limited dispute resolution by agree-
ment.
The budget of the organization could come from dues as-
sessed on members, perhaps based on the relative tax revenues
collected in each member country. The total budget should
represent only a very small percentage of national budgets
devoted to tax administration, reflecting the organization's
basic purpose of providing a service to each of its member
countries' tax administrations.
96. See van Raad, supra note 42, at 6.
97. Tanzi 1999, supra note 90, at 184.
98. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Taxation in a Borderless World: The
Role of Information Exchange, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN TAXATION: LAW AND
ECONOMICS 321 (Gustaf Lindencrona et al. eds., 1999).
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F. Transitional Arrangements and Derogations
The process of negotiating a unified tax treaty template
presumably would encourage countries to rationalize their
bilateral treaty relationships and, therefore, to minimize the
amount of derogation. While there would not be complete uni-
formity, the extent of the differences could be reduced substan-
tially. Replacement of the network of bilateral treaties with a
multilateral treaty therefore does not require all countries
effectively to scrap all provisions of their bilateral treaties.
While it would be desirable to achieve as great a harmoniza-
tion of bilateral agreements as possible, the multilateral treaty
can be designed in such a manner that each signatory can
enter reservations.
Existing treaties should remain in effect during a transi-
tion period. This would give negotiators time to review existing
treaties and determine to what extent the texts can be brought
into conformity with the uniform text. Countries would commit
to negotiate any new treaties on the basis of the uniform text.
This does not mean that there cannot be differences, but that
the treaties must take the form of agreement to the uniform
text subject to specified deviations. Eventually all tax treaties
would be brought into this format.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that multilateral action is needed to
establish an international organization for cooperation in taxa-
tion and a multilateral treaty to replace the current bilateral
tax treaty network. While I am confident that the arguments
in support of these steps are robust, I am also sure that the
road will not be an easy one, given that people tend to be wed-
ded to old ways. One possible bright spot is that there may be
more than one road. It would not be necessary for all the ele-
ments described in this article to be implemented precisely as
envisaged here. For example, an international agency for coop-
eration in taxation could be established separately, even with-
out an international treaty.99 This could grow into a formal
international organization and could provide a forum for nego-
99. Tax administrations could enter into agreements to cooperate and could
establish a secretariat just by incorporating it under some country's local law, in
advance of the creation of a public international organization.
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tiation of a multilateral treaty. In addition, or alternatively,
steps could be taken in the direction of some of the proposals
of this paper by the OECD or some forum created by it. Thus,
for example, the OECD recently has created a forum for dis-
cussion of harmful tax practices.

